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Formalities and Requisites of a Deed
in Kentucky
By WEsLEY GiLwM, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The most oft done work of the general practitioner in law
today involves the law of deeds. It may be the drafting of a deed,
the examination of several deeds in a chain of title, or the passing
upon a deed's sufficiency for a client who is a purchaser.
Historically, the term "deed" included all varieties of sealed
instruments, but by common usage today it has come to be limited
to an instrument for the conveyance of real property.1 In view of
the fact that at common law real property was conveyed by a
ceremony, or an act, a written instrument today takes the place
of that act, but bears a name which suggests the idea of an act,
to-wit a "deed". 2
II. STATUTORY DncavEs
In many states the law of deeds has been simplified and made
uniform by statutes which provide that a writing in a prescribed
form shall be effective to transfer the title to real property.3 We
in Kentucky have not been so fortunate, however, and the statu-
tory directions are few. The main statute in Kentucky simply
provides that an owner may convey any interest in real property,
not in the adverse possession of another, and it further provides
that no estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more
than one year, shall be conveyed except by deed or will.4
It might be interesting to note here that the legislature has
not seen fit to leave the drafting of deeds to lawyers, but has pro-
vided that the Court of Appeals' rules governing the practice of
* A.B., LL.B., University of Cincinnati. Board of Editors, Cincinnati Law
Review, 1950. Member of Kentucky and Ohio bars. Attorney-at-law, Cowan Bldg.,
Danville, Ky.
'16 AM. Jum., Deeds 437 (sec. 2) (1938).
'16 AM. Jur., Deeds 444 (sec. 12) (1938).
'16 AM. Jon., Deeds 446 (sec. 17) (1938).
" Ky. REv. STAT., see. 882.010. The subject of wills will not be dealt with in
this article.
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law shall not prevent a person (not holding himself out as a
practicing attorney) from writing a deed, mortgage, or will.5 Such
legislation accounts in part, no doubt, for the odd instruments
that we, who read this article, shall observe passing through our
courts.
III. LAw OF THE CAsES
In view of the lack of statutory direction available to us in
Kentucky, we must find our law of deeds in the decided cases of
the state.
A. Operation and Purpose
We shall first observe some Kentucky cases in which the in-
strument under consideration was not a deed, or was not sufficient
to convey any title from one party to another.
In an early case the Court of Appeals considered an instru-
ment in writing, written on a deed to the signer, which read as
follows:
I do hereby relinquish all the right and title to the
within mentioned tract of land, that I hold by deed or any
other claim whatsoever; as witness my hand and seal, this
7th day of July, 1812.
Thomas Garnett (Seal)
This instrument was held to be of no force and effect to transfer
any title. Was it because it lacked formality? Was it because
there was no source of title, no elaborate description set out, or
no certificate of acknowledgment? No, this instrument was value-
less because it did not tell us to whom the relinquishment was
made. The court said that Thomas Garnett could not part with
anything by virtue of that instrument, because it did not purport
to give to anyone, and no one could make a claim under it.( A
similar case was presented many years later; and the court
decided it the same way. In that case there was an indorsement
on the margin of a deed record, in which record the deed re-
served a life estate, the indorsement stating that the indorser
relinquished all his right or claim in the deed. The court there
stated that this surely was not a conveyance, because there was
no grantee named, there was no description of what was granted,
Subsection (3), Ky. REv. STAT. see. 30.170.6 Garett v. Garnett's Lessee, 23 Ky. 545, 7 T. B. Mon. 545 (1828).
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and there was no statement of consideration. 7 Both cases are
apparently the law in Kentucky today.8
Another abortive instrument is revealed by the case of Stamper
v. Lunsford,0 wherein an instrument was signed, acknowledged,
and recorded, that recited that the owner of certain real property
"willed" it to his wife for life, and that the son should take the
balance of the land. The instrument began with the words, "This
indenture . . .". The court held that the described instrument
was not valid as a deed because it didn't pass a present interest,
there was no grantor or grantee, there was no consideration, and
there was nothing to indicate that the instrument was intended to
be a deed except the beginning words, "This indenture...".
An interesting case was presented by the facts of Morgan v.
Big Woods Lumber Company0 in which a father of several
children had a plat made with his children's initials on certain
parcels on that plat. The court held that this did not invest the
intended grantee with title, because mere intention is insufficient.
This article, as it progresses, will present more vivid reasons for
the decision, particularly in F., Conveying Function, infra.
B. Bare Essentials and Informal Instruments
Let us now turn to the other side of the picture, and take a
look at some instances where the Court of Appeals has found
that a writing, though informal or inartfully drawn, is sufficient
to constitute a deed of conveyance, and the reasons for the
decisions.
In 1834 the court was called upon to consider an instrument
that was written as follows:
For value received, I bargain and sell unto Arthur
Conley, my whole right of improvement made by John
Brown, and all the land as far as Thomas Miller's claim
interferes with my claim. Given under my hand and seal,
this 7th day of February, 1806.
William Bridges (Seal)
Test. Thomas Boyd )
John Robinson )
Miller v. Prater, 267 Ky. 11, 100 S.W. 2d 842 (1937).
'A search of Shepards Kentucky Citations reveals nothing that would indicate
otherwise. '185 Ky. 558, 215 S.W. 297 (1919).10198 Ky. 88, 249 S.W. 329 (1923). See also City of Bowling Green v. Board
of Edn of Bowling Green, 278 S.W. 2d 726 (Ky. 1955).
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The instrument, as can be seen, was simple, direct and without
formality. The court expressly held, and such is the law today,
that the instrument is a conveyance in fee simple, because its
literal import is of an executed agreement, or conveyance of title.
The court called it a deed of bargain and sale, citing Coke on Lit-
tleton and Kent's Comentaries."
Another old Kentucky case that bears on the problem is Pat-
terson v. Carneat's Heirs.2 There the Court of Appeals considered
the following informal instrument, written upon a copy of a
decree of foreclosure, and held that it was a good deed of con-
veyance:
For and in consideration of the full amount speci-
fied in the foregoing decree, paid to me by James Coleman,
in his individual capacity and not as administrator, I do
hereby transfer, assign and convey to said James Coleman,
in his own right, all my right, title, claim and interest in the
said decree, and all my right and title in and to the mortgage
and mortgaged property therein specified, and do hereby
authorise the said James Coleman, in my name and for me,
to act in the premises as fully as I might or could do, if
personally present, and to make use of my name in any legal
manner that may be deemed necessary for the purpose of
obtaining the amount of said decree. Given under my
hand and seal this 9th day of May, 1812.
William May (Seal)
The court said that regardless of how informal an instrument
may be, the words "Transfer, assign and convey", especially the
word "convey", are sufficient to answer the requisites of a com-
mon law grant, to carry a legal estate, and to vest it in the grantee
under statute. This is apparently still good subsisting law in
Kentucky.13
More recently the court had before it the problem of an instru-
ment that had no habendum or tenendum clause, and in which
the covenants preceeded the words of grant. Nevertheless, the
court upheld the instrument as a deed of conveyance, and said
that it was sufficient to convey title because it stated: the names
of the parties; the consideration for its execution; the instru-
"Chiles v. Conley's Heirs, 32 Ky. 21, 2 Dana. 22 (1834).
10 Ky. 618, 3 A. K. Marsh. 1380, 13 Am. Dec. 208 (18-1).
"See supra note 8.
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ment's purpose to convey title to the grantee; a certain descrip-
tion; and a general warranty. The court also considered the fact
that there was no repugnancy in the instrument.14
Babb v. Dowdy 5 presented the Court of Appeals with a very
poorly written instrument that the court held to be a valid deed.
The material parts of the deed are as follows:
Dowdy & Wilson to Fannie Davinie, et al.
For the consideration of the sum of one dollar and
other valuable consideration paid and to be paid as follows,
viZ.:
We, C. L. Dowdy and wife, Jennie Dowdy, C. W.
Wilson and wife, Adella Wilson, have sold and hereby con-
vey with covenant of General Warranty to Fannie Davinie,
the fee simple title in and to said real estate, subject to the
mineral rights of W. M. Babb, his heirs and assigns. The
mineral rights in and to the hereinafter described land being
conveyed to the said W. M. Babb, his heirs and assigns,
the following described real estate lying in district No. 6,
Graves County, Kentucky, viz.
The court held that this instrument was a valid conveyance of
the mineral rights to W. M. Babb, and the remaining fee to Fan-
nie Davinie. It stated that although a deed is inartfully drawn, in
construing it the court endeavors to ascertain the intention of the
parties, and that the trend of decisions is to uphold a deed as any
other contract, however informally it may be drawn, when the
terms of the instrument are sufficient to express the intention of
the parties. Such seems to be the general rifle.16
C. Grantors
If a person is not named, or identified in some way, as a grantor
or mortgagor in the instrument, he is not usually bound by the
deed or mortgage, although it is signed and acknowledged by
him.17 One Kentucky case goes so far as to say that no representa-
" Meisberg v. Bryant, 184 Ky: 600, 212 S.W. 600 (1919). Some of the reasons
used to support the court's decision seem unnecessary in view of other cases that
will be pointed out infra.
229 Ky. 767, 17 S.W. 2d 1014 (1929).
" 16 Am. JuR., Deeds 467-8 (see. 47) (1938).
"Goodrum's G'd'n. v. Kelsey, 244 Ky. 349, 50 S.W. 2d 932 (1932), and
Whitaker v. Langdon, 302 Ky. 666, 195 S.W. 2d 285 (1946).
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tion or conduct on the signer's part amounting to an estoppel is
to be taken from the fact that the person did sign the deed."8
It is not necessary that the full and complete names of the
grantors be set out, however. In Stephens v. Perkins0 the deed
named the grantors only as "we, the heirs of Whitmill Stephens",
but the court held such a description of grantors to be sufficient
because the deed was signed by the heirs, and because they were
sufficiently described so that they could be identified.
Attaching no importance to the fact that a mortgage recited
that it was given to secure the indebtedness of N. H., the court
held that N. H. was not bound by the mortgage which he signed
and acknowledged, but in which h6 was not named or identified
as a grantor or mortgagor.20
A deed of a wife's land, in which she was not named as a
grantor, but in which the wife joined and signed "to relinquish
all right to dower" was held of no effect as to the wife's land, be-
cause she did not join with the husband as a grantor.2'
D. Grantees
In" Huntsman v. Bryant"- the court considered a well drawn
deed that had just one shortcoming. That deficiency was the odd
fact that there was no one named as grantee, or "parties of the
second part" as used in the instrument. The court held that
nothing passed by that instrument because in every grant there
must be a grantor, a grantee, and a thing granted. The general
rule is that the instrument must purport to pass title to someone.23
There are exceptions to that rule, however, as pointed out in
a 1939 Kentucky case.24 In that case there was a lease in which
the name of the lessee was left completely blank. The court,
'
8 Hall v. Ditto, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 667, 12 S.W. 941 (1890).
19209 Ky. 651, 278 S.W. 545 (1925). This case distinguished Parsons v.
Justice, 163 Ky. 731, 174 S.W. 725 (1915) wherein S.D. and her husband weren't
mentioned or identified in the body of the deed as, grantors.
.' See supra note 17. Accord, Shaver v. Ellis, 226 Ky. 806, 11 S.W. 2d 949
(1928).
'Bankston v. Crabtreet Coal Mining Co., 95 Ky. 455, 25 S.W. 1105 (1894).
The proposition for which this case is cited, however, was dictum, because the
court went on to hold that if she did have any cause of action, it was barred by
the statute of limitations.
196 Ky. 312, 244 S.W. 701 (1922).
Caddell v. Eagle Coal Company, 144 Ky. 396, 138 S.W. 304 (1911); Miller
v. Prater, supra note 7; Garnett v. Gamett's Lessee, supra note 6.
" Foley v. Givens, 277 Ky. 584, 126 S.W. 2d 1128 (1939).
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however, construed the receipt for down payment, which was
simultaneously executed, to supply the omitted name of the
lessee, because there was but one transaction.25
This problem of naming the grantees is particularly important
in the cases of husband and wife. Following the principal rule,
the words "and wife" appearing after the name of the grantee in
the caption of the deed, without naming her anywhere or
mentioning her in the granting or habendum clauses, is not suf-
ficient designation of her as a grantee to convey her any interest
in the property.2 6
A case with facts a bit more in the favor of the wife's receiving
an interest presented a deed as follows:
The deed read 'to J. and his wife, N. grantees' in
the caption; in the conveying clause it read 'to grantee, his
heirs and assigns'; and the habendum stated that 'grantees'
were to have and to hold, followed by 'the said J. and his
heirs and assigns forever.'
Admittedly this was a rather confusing set of words, but the
court held that the deed conveyed the land in question to J. alone,
and not to I. and N. Accordingly, the court ordered reformation
of the deed to allow an interest to the wife, N.27
In Clark v. Northern Coal & Coke Company2 a deed called
for the grantees to be "Russell Pinson and wife, heirs of Henry
Pinson, deceased" and appeared to be a settlement of an estate.
The court held that the wife took nothing, because of the ap-
parent nature of the deed, the fact that the wife assumed no legal
obligation under the deed (the consideration being a promise by
Russell Pinson), the fact that the wife was not an heir of Henry
Pinson, deceased, and because the court concluded that the wife
was mentioned by inadvertence.
While we are still dealing with the subject of parties to a deed,
it seems valuable to note here that Kentucky Revised Statute sec-
tion 382.430 requires of the draftsman as follows:
In doing so, the court followed Hardin v. Kazee, 238 Ky. 526, 38 S.W. 2d
438 (1931) which interpreted a check and deed as one instrument on an issue
of delivery of the deed.
'Russell v. Clemons, 264 S.W. 2d 879 (Ky. 1954). Where she was named
in the caption, the result was the same. Loughridge v. Ball, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 1123,
118 S.W. 321 (1909).
Saylor v. Helton, 194 Ky. 195, 238 S.W. 405 (1922).
383 Ky. L. Rep. 1047, 112 S.W. 629 (1908).
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(1) No mortgage, conveyance or other instrument
or writing constituting a lien or other security for any note
or other evidence of indebtedness shall be received for
record by any county clerk unless such mortgage, convey-
ance or other writing gives the county and state of the resi-
dence and the post office address of the person or corpora-
tion owning or holding the note or other evidence of in-
debtedness, or liable for the payment of taxes thereon.
(2) Should there be an assignment of such note
or other evidence of indebtedness, of record in the clerk's
office, the assignment shall state the county and state of the
residence and post office address of the assignee. Unless
any assignment is made of record, the original holder or
owner shall be liable for taxes as though no assignment had
been made.
E. Consideration
Does there have to be a consideration, or a recital of one, for
the deed to be a valid conveyance?
An early Kentucky case presented the problem of an obliga-
tion, under seal, given by a father to his son, for the conveyance
of land.29 The only consideration for the obligation was the rela-
tionship of father and son, and the son sought specific performance
of the obligation after the death of his father. The court allowed
specific performance of the agreement, reasoning that the Statute
of Uses allows it, and prior to the time of the Statute of Uses,
chancery courts in England must have allowed it, because the
Statute of Uses only operates to transfer possession of a use
where there is a valid use created.
In 1923 the Court of Appeals stated that when the grantee
knows all the facts, a grantor is not bound by a deed which is
executed without consideration if the grantor sues for cancellation
of the deed.30
Following the 1923 decision, the court again was presented
with the problem of consideration in a 1940 case."' The suit in-
volved a petition by deceased's daughter and her mother after
the death of the father, to determine whether a deed from the
'M'Intyre v. Hughes, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb.) 186 (1815). This was a case of an
executory contract, however; not of an executed deed.
' Beliles v. Whittaker, 199 Ky. 481, 251 S.W. 190 (1923). The case was
reversed on procedural grounds, however.
a Saylor v. Saylor, 282 Ky. 246, 138 S.W. 2d 316 (1940).
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father, then deceased, to the mother was good. The court flatly
stated that there need be no consideration to support the con-
veyance, and so held. Another case decided that year illuminated
the problem more, when the court stated that a person possessed
of sufficient mental capacity to understand, etc., could give or sell
his property to whomsoever he chooses. 2
In two subsequent cases, decided in 1943 and 1946, the Court
of Appeals has held that a deed is not void for want of considera-
tion, because a person in his right mind may give away what he
owns without regard to the wishes of those who are without legal
demands against him. 3
Let's now pass on to the situation where a deed is made in
consideration of grantee's agreement of future support. The law
in such case is that if there is a failure to support as agreed, the
conveyance is valid, but is subject to recision at the complaint
of the grantor.3 4
The matter of inadequacy of consideration is dealt with in the
same way as the matter of lack of consideration, the cases holding
that it is for the contracting parties to judge the sufficiency of the
consideration, and a party possessing his faculties may do as he
pleases with his property because of his right to will it away upon
death." '
An issue of reasonable importance is what should be done
when a deed on its face lacking consideration appears in a chain
of title. In the case of Prewitt v. Morgan's Heirs3 the court tells
us what the presumption is, when the deed recites the considera-
tion to be "$ .......... in hand paid." The court said that although
the consideration was left blank in the deed, the certificate of
acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of execution, importing
a valuable consideration, and that he who attacks the deed must
show the negative fact of lack of consideration.
There is a statute relative to consideration which should be
'Tarter v. Eaton, 282 Ky. 219, 138 S.W. 2d 342 (1940).
'Damron v. Damron, 301 Ky. 636, 192 S.W. 2d 741 (1946); Sullenger v.
Baker, 296 Ky. 240, 176 S.W. 2d 382 (1943).
"Bostic v. Bostic, 264 S.W. 2d 59 (Ky. 1954); Bracken v. Johnson, 249 S.W.
2d 149 (Ky. 1952). (The case of Bracken v. Johnson also involved undue in-
fluence.)
'Hatfield v. Pond Creek Coal Company, 201 Ky. 644, 258 S.W. 98 (1924);
Todd's Heirs v. Wickliffe, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 866 (1858).
119 S.W. 174 (Ky. 1909).
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noted here, which provides that when any real property is con-
veyed, and any part of the consideration remains unpaid, the
grantor must state in the deed what part remains unpaid, or he
shall not have a lien for the unpaid consideration against bona fide
purchasers and creditors.37
For other reasons than matters pertaining to the law of deeds,
however, we must state that a consideration, if there in fact be
one, should always be recited in the deed. 8
F. The Conveying Function
As was pointed out in A., Operation & Purpose, supra, the case
of Stamper v. Lunsford39 presented to the court a very badly
drawn instrument. There the instrument took on the form of a
deed, but was worded like a will. The court held that the in-
strument, although styled an indenture, was not valid to convey
any title to anyone, because it did not convey any present
interest.
Going on with that particular phase of the requisites of a
Kentucky deed, we point out that parties may call an instrument
whatever they please, but the test for determining what the in-
strument really is-for our purposes whether it is a deed-is to
find what the instrument does. If the effect of the instrument is
to sever the estate and vest title in another, it is a deed regardless
of how it is styled.40 That principal was applied in Duncan v.
Greene,41 where the instrument under consideration granted a
privilege to reduce minerals to the possession of another, but did
not grant the minerals in place in the ground. The instrument
was called an indenture, but did not provide for the severance
of the estate in the minerals. The court held that the instrument
was not a deed.
On the other side of the mineral picture, where the words
"grant", "bargain", and "sell" are used in connection with minerals
in place, adding words of inheritance, it is presumed that the
instrument is a deed, regardless of what the parties call it.4
' Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 382.070.
' 16 Am. Jim., Deeds 472-474 (sees. 57-58) (1938). - Supra note 9.
" Duncan v. Mason, 289 Ky. 570, 39 S.W. 2d 1006 (1931).
'253 S.W. 2d 592 (Ky. 1952).
"Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Carter, 303 Ky. 559, 198 S.W. 2d 311
(1946).
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Accordingly, it was held43 that a certain instrument was a deed
of mineral rights, rather than a deed, because: (1) the instrument
purported to be an absolute conveyance, with the usual granting
and habendum clauses, and words of inheritance; (2) the con-
sideration was adequate ($1.00 per acre in 1930), plus payment
out of oil that might be produced; (3) no time for oil operations
was provided; and (4) there was an agreement that pipelines
should be buried below plow depth, and further agreement that
the land should be protected against drainage by offset walls, all
of which are consistent with a parting with the title to the minerals
and a desire to protect the remaining surface rights.
Strict formal words of conveyance are not required for the
conveyance of property by deed. When words of equivalent
meaning are used, that is satisfactory. When a writing recites the
making of a former deed, and then sets out that the writing is
made to correct or make good that former deed, such is a valid
deed of correction, because the court looks to the words of the
instrument to see what was intended by the "fair and natural
meaning of the language."44
A similar case with a like result was Taylor v. Kleier 5 in which
a deed recited that a certain trustee joined in the conveyance "to
release any claim he may have on said trust property herein
conveyed". The instrument conveyed good title because the mani-
fest purpose of the parties was to part with all of the trustee's
title.4"
Covenants of warranty do not constitute any operative part
of the instrument, says one Kentucky case,47 and a quitclaim deed
conveys land as well as any other deed.48 That Kentucky case was
criticized, however, in a later federal decision,49 which said that
the test in the case is inaccurate. That case says that the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of a quitclaim deed is that it conveys
the grantor's title in the property, rather than the property itself.
'Ramsey v. Yunker, 311 Ky. 820, 226 S.W. 2d 14 (1950).
"East Jelico Coal Co. v. Jones, 141 Ky. 306, 132 S.W. 411 (1910).
'n15 Ky. L. Rep. 859, 26 S.W. 3 (1894).
The court went on to support its reasoning with the facts that the trustee had
title, the deed was for a consideration, and that the trustee had power to sell.
" Hosman v. Willett, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 107 S.W. 334 (1908).
" The words used in the deed, however, were of bargain, sale and conveyance.
"Brown v. Harvey Coal Corp., 49 F. 2d 434 (D.C., E.D. Ky., 1931). This
case contains a good survey of Kentucky, and other, cases on the problem of
quitclaim deeds.
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The distinction may appear to be splitting hairs, but the practical
application is set out in the federal case thus: A title acquired by
a grantor of a quitclaim deed after making that deed does not
inure to the benefit of the grantee in that quitclaim deed, but if
the deed purports to convey an estate in land, subsequently ac-
quired title inures to the benefit of the grantee.
G. Description
In order to convey a title to something, that "something" must
be certain and ascertained.50 The description need not be elabo-
rate, but must be more than "it."51 The county and state where
the property is located, however, need not be set out to make a
deed valid.52 Nor must the deed describe the land by metes or
bounds, or give the number of acres.5
The test of sufficiency of a description is whether the land can
be located from the description, 4 and where the description is
uncertain, but can be made certain, the conveyance will pass the
title." The limitation of the rule seems well illustrated by the
case of Fordson Coal Company v. Roark"' wherein the issue was
adverse possession under color of title. The court found that no
surveyor could locate any boundary by the vague and indefinite
description in the deed, and thereupon concluded that the deed
did not divest title, furnish evidence of a claim, or notice thereof.
(The deed failed to describe completely more than one side of
the tract which it purported to convey).
The deed description is sufficient to convey title, if a surveyor,
using the deed and extrinsic evidence, can locate the land and
establish its boundaries. Thus, a description in a deed that reads,
"beginning at a white oak, thence to a beech" is not so indefinite
as to invalidate the deed, when there is extrinsic evidence that
" 16 Am. JuR., Deeds 584 et seq. (secs. 260-261) (1938).
"Strode v. Ackerman, 141 Ky. 700, 133 S.W. 767 (1911). The case in-
volved an action for specific performance of a contract to sell, in which the
writing under the statute of frauds was a letter referring to the sale of something
called "it'. The court said that this was not a sufficient description to comply
with the statute of frauds.
" Perry v. Wilson, 183 Ky. 155, 208 S.W. 776 (1919). A deed was good that
conveyed all of grantor's interest in the real estate of his father, R. H. H., deceased.
"Ison v. Wolf, 153 Ky. 650, 156 S.W. 128 (1913). Deed only described the
land conveyed as all of grantor's interest in their father's estate.
Culton v. Napier, 272 Ky. 384, 114 S.W. 2d 480 (1938).
'Armstrong v. Mudd, 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 144 (1849).
"Fordson Coal Co. v. Boark, 214 Ky. 247, 283 S.W. 106 (1926).
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such lines have been surveyed, marked, and located on the
ground. 57 Therefore, a deed description is sufficient if it names
the abutting owners,5" or names the boundaries, such as a creek
and named adjoining owners, with a statement of acreage. 59
Various descriptions that have been upheld by the Court of
Appeals include: all of grantors' interest in their father's estate;60
all of grantor's interest in the real estate of his father, R. H. H.,
deceased;"' land on Buck Creek known as the Hai's Mill property
near the mouth of Hound Hollow; 2 "my undivided interest and
share to a certain tract or parcel of land of which my father, S. 0.,
aforesaid, died siesed and possessed, lying on the waters of L. S.
fork of C. river in W. county, containing about 356 acres in all"; 63
and "lying in B. County, Kentucky, and described as follows:
Our entire interest in the P. farm, except ,/2 acre, more or less, on
the northeast corner of said farm where I. now lives".64
The law does not require that the description be completely
accurate, because the test of sufficiency is whether the land can
be located from the description.65 The court follows a maxim
which means, "that is certain which may be rendered certain". 66
Thus, where it is apparent from the description that something is
omitted, those omitted words may be inserted to identify the land
conveyed; 7 and a deed was upheld where there was a misnomer
of the creek upon which the land is situated. Although "ease'
was used instead of "west" in the description, the title was
merchantable when the parties agreed upon the exact piece of
ground conveyed, because of the contemporaneous construction.6 9
Where two tracts of land were embraced in the same deed, the
" Ken-Tex Exploration Company v. Conner, 251 S.W. 2d 280 (Ky. 1952).
' Lawrence Oil Corp. v. Metcalfe, 241 Ky. 353, 43 S.W. 2d 986 (1931).
' Superior Oil Corp. v. Alcorn, 242 Ky. 814, 47 S.W. 2d 973 (1932).
' Ison v. Wolf, supra note 51.
'Perry v. Wilson, supra note 50.
Jones v. Hargis, 286 Ky. 353, 150 S.W. 2d 928 (1941).
'Foster v. Roberts, 179 Ky. 752, 201 S.W. 334 (1918).
"Porter v. Porter, 135 Ky. 813, 123 S.W. 302 (1909). This was a good
description because P. only owned one farm in B. county, it was known as the "P.
land, and J. had purchased V acre of that tract.
' Culton v. Napier, supra note 54.
'Casteel v. Pennington, 228 Ky. 206, 14 S.W. 2d 753 (1929). (Id. certum
est quod certum reddi potest.)
"Ibid.
"Culton v. Napier, supra note 54.
"Fidelity Realty Co. v. Flahaven Land Co., 193 Ky. 355, 236 S.W. 260(1922).
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omission of the closing line in the boundary in describing one tract
was immaterial where the omitted line was the one separating
the two tracts.7 °
Hensley v. Burt & Brabb Lumber Company71 presented a case
of a mistake in a patent, and the court held that it was permissible
to look to any other document of record called for or alluded to,
to ascertain where the error was and thereby correct it, in order
to find the intention of the grantor. In following the Hensley
case, Thurman v. Leach 72 held that to locate the lines of a patent
was the ascertainment of a fact, and evidence was admitted, such
as recitals of other patents calling for that line, recitals of the
grant in question, testimony of witnesses who had seen the marked
lines or any of the comers, and evidence of reputation as to the
true location.
A different problem was presented in Johnson v. Harris,73
wherein the deed called for a line, but didn't state whether its
course was straight or curved. The plaintiff said that it was
straight, and the defendant contended that it was shaped like an
arc that followed natural topographic contours. The court held
that in such a case, there was presented a question for the jury
under the evidence.
Though a deed may contain different calls from those con-
tained in the deed to grantor, if it refers to land as the same land
conveyed to grantor by a certain other deed, it conveys the same
tract conveyed to grantor by that other deed.74
In Grant v. Armstrong75 a wife executed a deed to her land,
but after a more particular description, described the land as her
husband's interest that he received as heir to M. In reality, the
wife had received the land from M., and the court held that the
deed passed good title to the land that she had received from M.
because the nomenclature was merely an error, and if it had been
left completely out of the deed, the deed would have passed
good title."
"Johnson v. Harris, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 449, 68 S.W. 844 (1902).
"132 Ky. 112, 116 S.W. 316 (1909).
-116 S.W. 300 (Ky. 1909).
"Supra note 68.
" Bassett v. Lush, 156 Ky. 490, 161 S.W. 227 (1913). Reference was to a
deed, giving date and record page.
18 Ky. L. Rep. 187, 16 S.W. 531 (1891).
The court further found that the wife intended to sell her interest.
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The phrase in a deed description, "more or less", relieves the
quantity with which it is used of exactness, and indicates that
the parties risk a slight deviation.77
The reader's attention is called to Kentucky Revised Statute
section 382.110 which requires that a deed, to be recordable, shall
state the grantor's source of title, including names of immediate
remote grantors, the page and book of the record on which the
deed is recorded, and the date thereof. This statutory require-
ment is a prerequisite to recordation, but if such requirement is
not met, the deed still conveys good title between the parties. 78
We might here note the requirement for descriptions in con-
veying an easement, which is simply that in order to convey an
easement, the description need only be of the land which is the
subject of the easement. When the right of way is not defined
or bounded, the law provides for a manner of bounding it. 70
It is prudent to also note here that under the provisions of
Kentucky Revised Statute section 881.200, every deed, unless an
exception is made in the deed, shall be construed to include all
buildings, privileges and appurtenances of every kind attached to
the lands therein conveyed.
H. Habendum
The habendum clause in a deed is that part of a formal instru-
ment that sets forth the estate to be held and enjoyed by the
grantee, but in modem conveyancing the habendum clause has
degenerated into a mere useless form in the normal case of a
good, well drawn instrument.80 Under the common law a man
'Goodloe v. Wallace, 269 S.W. 2d 718 (Ky. 1954); Eastland v. Robinson,
233 Ky. 403, 25 S.W. 2d 1028, 70 A.L.R. 365 (1930). See Boggs v. Bush, 137
Ky. 95, 122 S.W. 220 (1909) (where court found that discrepancy between deed
and survey amounted to 13%, and intimated that where deficit is less than 10%,
relief should not be granted, and if 10% or over relief should be granted); Rust
v. Carpenter, 158 Ky. 672, 166 S.W. 180 (1914) ("It is a well-known rule in thisjurisdiction that where, in the sale of a tract of land, there is a deficit of as much
as 10 per cent or more in the quantity, the purchaser will be entitled to relief to
the extent of the value of the deficit . . ."); and Lassiter v. Farris, 202 Ky. 33(,
259 S.W. 696 (1924) (holding that a deficit in quantity of more than 10%
authorized relief). As to remedy, however, see Woods v. Mason, 279 S.W. 2d 243(Ky. 1955).
"Perkins v. J. M. Robinson etc. Co., 124 S.W. 310 (Ky. 1910).
"Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 121 F. 2d 318 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941). Although a
federal case, Kentucky law was applied, and in the case the manner of bounding
the right of way, as provided by raw, is well described at 323.
116 Am. Jtu., Deeds 471 (Sec. 53) (1938).
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could not deprive his heirs of their inheritance except that he
use express words, and a grant without words of inheritance
operated to convey only a life estate.8' Under the statute now in
force in Kentucky8 and in most other states, no words of inherit-
ance are necessary to pass a fee simple title to the grantee. In
general practice today, a formal habendum clause is usually
inserted.
The granting clause of a deed will control in the case of an
irreconcilable conflict between it and the habendum clause, but
only in the case where grantor's intention can not be otherwise
ascertained. The habendum clause, therefore, may result in effect-
ing an ascertainment of the intention of the grantor.83
We might say, therefore, that a major function of a habendum
clause in today's deed in Kentucky is to remedy poor draftsman-
ship that is not discovered until the deed is almost drawn.
1. Signatures
An unsigned deed, though acknowledged by the grantor, is
not valid,84 and such is a well recognized rule throughout the
United States.85 There is no requirement that a signature by
mark be attested by a witness before the instrument is valid, but
as a matter of safety it ought to be done.8
K. Acknowledgment
Although it is not a requirement effecting the validity of a
deed itself,87 for all practical purposes a deed must be acknowl-
edged by the grantor, because the county court clerk can not
record it if it is not acknowledged.88 Although there are statutory
alternatives of acknowledgment, the usual form of acknowledg-
Ibid.
Ky. REV. STAT. sec. 381.060.
Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 491, 156 S.W. 2d 827 (1941).
Helton v. Asher, 103 Ky. 730, 46 S.W. 22 (1898). The decision was based
upon the statute of frauds.
.l16 Am. JuR., Deeds 491 (sec. 92) (1938).
'Blair v. Campbell, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 2012, 45 S.W. 93 (1898). Aside, the
court said that if there was any such requirement, the certificate of acknowledg-
ment of the county court clerk is sufficient in that respect.
8716 Am. JuR., Deeds 489-490 (sec. 90) (1938); and cases cited 2 Ky. Die.,
AcKNowLEDGMNTS see. 5 (1951).
'Ky. REV. STAT. see. 382.130-382.170.
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ment is for the grantors to appear before a notary public or
county court clerk and acknowledge the instrument.8 9
L. Revenue Stamps
Congress has enacted a document tax, requiring stamps on
deeds, which is purely a revenue measure. The absence of the
stamps neither invalidates the deed, nor makes it inadmissible in
evidence."
ibid.
16 Am. Jur., Deeds 490 (sec. 91) (1938).
